Abstract-Detection of explosives has the flavor of those mathematical problems that are not invertible. It is easier to hide explosives than to find them. Many approaches have been proposed and executed for the remote detection of explosives, contraband materials, weapons of mass destruction, currency, etc. Most detection technologies suffer from a common problem: the features they look for, such as discontinuties in electrical conductivity, are not unique properties of the target but are contained, to some degree, in the more benign surroundings. Such a degeneracy leads to "clutter" in the response. For example, resolving the false alarms generated by this clutter can determine the rate of advance of a conventional electromagnetic metal detector employed as a landmine detector. One approach that provides a "unique" signature is nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR) (the technique is also called QR, to avoid confusion with strictly nuclear techniques). This paper outlines the important physical principles behind the use of NQR for remote detection, indicates areas of applicability, and presents recent results of field trials of a prototype landmine detection system.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Landmine Problem
W
HILE the statistics describing the landmine problem are highly imprecise, the magnitude is well-appreciated. The United Nations estimates that about 80 million landmines are in place worldwide, with a substantial inventory still available. The military encounters landmines in a wide range of situations: from mine fields sown according to well-documented military doctrine to stop or divert tanks, to the guerilla use of landmines as a tool of terrorism. Conventional military requirements involve breeching mine fields at a rapid tempo, as well as clandestine infiltration through mine fields. In either case, the main objective is to identify a route through a minefield, by either brute force or skill, with little concern for finding and neutralizing individual mines. At the other limit is the overwhelming humanitarian problem of returning land to normal use after military, terrorist, or guerilla activity has placed mines. Furthermore, it is expected that these demarcations will become blurred as the military becomes involved in low intensity conflicts.
B. Limitations of Conventional Detection Methods
The basic technology for both military and humanitarian mine detection is still the electromagnetic (EM) metal detector, a direct descendant of those used in World War II. Finding a metal-encased antitank (AT) mine (5-10 kg of explosive) buried 10 cm underground is trivial for such a device, but finding a "low-metal" antipersonnel (AP) mine (50-100 g of explosive, and perhaps 0.5 g of metal for the firing pin) below the surface is highly challenging. The EM return signal from the AP mine is much weaker, and so the operator must turn up the detection threshold. At higher sensitivity, however, much more of the other metal detritus such as nails, shell fragments, etc., becomes visible to the detector. The operator is compelled to operate at very high sensitivity and to flag any alarm as a potential landmine. Unfortunately, the next step is the most difficult: one must then separate the landmines from the false alarms arising from this benign background of signals. Currently, that "resolution of false alarms" is still done by mechanical probing: the deminer or combat engineer performs very delicate archeology with a pointed stick to classify the source of the EM signal (a landmine, perhaps rigged with an antihandling device, or just a rusty nail). In that sense, finding landmines is easy: separating them from the clutter is the tough and extremely hazardous part.
This simplistic argument for the EM detector can be carried through for most of the other landmine detection approaches: ground penetrating radar, active and passive infrared imaging, seismic, X-ray backscatter, etc. While the response from a mine may be sizeable, especially for the active electromagnetic methods, the return signal is not unique to the mine, and separating the false alarms due to clutter from the landmines is still a problem. Indeed, the relatively modest improvements in mine detection technology made over the past 50 years suggest that this simple argument adequately describes the problem.
C. Why Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR)?
What is desired is a detector based on a signal that is specific to the landmine. Certainly, a unique signature of the explosive would provide a way to reduce this clutter problem. Such arguments lead to chemical detection of the explosives in landmines. While dogs are being used to find landmines, their method of detection is still a subject of controversy, and their efficiency is not high. The vapor pressure of the military explosives used in landmines is quite low, and commercially manufactured mines hermetically seal the explosives in a polymeric case. Further, 0196-2892/01$10.00 © 2001 IEEE as explosive vapors and particles are quite sticky, the transport of explosive from the main charge, through the case, and then through the ground is slow and inefficient. Vapor sensors have been explored for landmine detection, and there is a very recent indication that under some field conditions, exquisitely sensitive vapor detectors can detect the plume from a landmine [1] .
But there is another method, nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR), that is specific to the chemistry of an explosive, regardless of how it is packaged. Here we present a rudimentary discussion of the basics of NQR, discuss some of the engineering challenges for fielding an NQR explosives detector, and then show early results from a demonstration of a laboratory prototype in the field. We also sketch some of the history of NQR for mine detection.
We note that NQR is not a "remote sensor" as are airborne or satellite optical technologies. However, in magnetic resonance, one distinguishes between examining specimens contained within the NQR detector coil (see below) and the "remote" applications, for which the specimen is outside. As the detection efficiency drops off rapidly with distance, these remote NQR applications are limited to inspecting the region within a coil radius or so, of order 10-100 cm.
As with any sensor, there are limitations to NQR. The NQR signals are inherently weak, and, as we will discuss, much effort has been devoted to increasing the size of these signals relative to the thermal noise of the detector coil, as well as any external RF interference. Secondly, since NQR uses an RF transmitter and receiver, see the following, NQR does not directly detect explosives in metal-cased mines. However, such a metal-case mine alters the tuning of a NQR detector coil, and it is found that even the simple automatic tuning of the coil will indicate the presence of an RF-shielded volume, appropriate to a metal-case mine.
II. BASICS OF NQR
NQR [2] is a magnetic resonance phenomenon related to nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and its offspring, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). In NMR and MRI, a large static magnetic field (0.05-20 T, 500 G-200 kG) orients the nuclei so that slightly more are in the low energy state (aligned parallel to the static field) than are in the higher state (opposed to the field). This population difference is dictated by the Boltzmann factor that involves the energy of this Zeeman splitting ( is Planck's constant, and is the Larmor frequency corresponding to the Zeeman splitting) and , the thermal energy. For example, in a hospital MRI system, the Larmor frequency of the protons (in the human body) is 64 MHz, leading to a population difference of 10 . This population difference corresponds to a weak diamagnetism of the nuclear spins, with a classical magnetization vector aligned along the static magnetic field. The magnetic field corresponding to this weak nuclear diamagnetism can be observed by applying a resonant RF pulse (at the Larmor frequency and at right angles to the static field), causing the magnetization to rotate away from the axis of the static magnetic field. Conventionally, this RF field is turned off after the magnetization has rotated 90 (the condition for the so-called 90 pulse), so the magnetization vector is then perpendicular to both the static magnetic field and the RF field axes. The magnetization then precesses freely in the static field, at the Larmor frequency, and this time-dependent flux will induce a weak voltage in an RF pickup coil perpendicular to the static field. This induced signal is the NMR signal.
A. Comparison to NMR
NQR is similar to NMR, but with some important distinctions. In NQR, the splitting of the nuclear spin states is determined by the electrostatic interaction of the nuclear charge density , with the external electric potential of the surrounding electron cloud, see Fig. 1 . A moment expansion of this electrostatic interaction shows that the important coupling is between the nuclear quadrupole moment, indicated schematically in Fig. 1 , and the second derivative of the electric potential (equivalently, the gradient of the electric field). This is a key result. The quadrupole moment, nonzero only for nuclei with spin quantum number 1, is a nuclear physics parameter describing the distribution of charge in the nucleus (for landmine applications, the primary nucleus of interest is , with 1). The second term, the coupling to the electric field gradient of the valence electrons, is largely based on chemistry, although the local crystal packing also plays a role. Depending on the symmetry of the bonds, the NQR frequencies can range from zero up to some maximum (see the following).
Contrast the chemical specificity of NQR with that of NMR. While NMR provides highly detailed information about chemical structure, the range of "chemical shifts" is generally small, and often unresolvable in the solid state. Hydrogens or carbons in any arbitrary organic structure differ by a range of about 10 ppm or 200 ppm away from their nominal NMR frequencies, respectively. For NQR, the NQR frequencies can range from zero to 6 MHz, depending on the symmetry of the molecule. Indeed, one of the difficulties of NQR is that it can be too sensitive to the chemistry of the compound of interest.
There are also some significant subtleties in NQR compared with NMR: for NQR the nuclear spin is 1, and the spins are quantized along the principal axis system of the electric field gradient, rather than for the NMR or MRI case that (commonly) involves spin-1/2 nuclei quantized along the static magnetic field. For the present purpose, these distinctions are best overlooked, and, in a rough sense, it suffices to regard NQR as NMR without the magnet. 
B. NQR as a Detector
One significant advantage of NQR is the absence of a magnet. Even if the NMR approach were thought to give some advantage to detecting explosives, projecting a large static magnetic field into the ground is difficult. But the main advantage is that NQR provides a highly specific, arguably unique, frequency signature for the material of interest. Fig. 2 shows the NQR frequencies for a number of common explosives as well as some narcotics and other materials. Though the chemical structure of RDX (Fig. 3) indicates that the three ring nitrogens are chemically equivalent and hence would be expected to have identical NQR frequencies, in fact the crystal packing is sufficient to remove this degeneracy, and indeed the chemically equivalent ring nitrogens are separated by an order of 100 kHz from one another (see Fig. 2 ). This demonstrates the specificity of NQR. Even such small effects from crystal packing are sufficient to resolve the NQR lines from nominally equivalent nitrogens. Since the bandwidth of excitation is only about 5 kHz for a 200 s RF pulse, NQR lines more than 5 kHz away from the carrier will not be excited.
For landmine detection, TNT, RDX, and, to a lesser extent, tetryl are the most important explosives. The basic detection concept is particularly simple: apply a pulse or series of RF pulses resonant at the appropriate NQR frequency of the explosives of interest and look for the presence (or absence) of a return signal.
III. ESTIMATION OF SNR FOR LANDMINE DETECTION
Unfortunately, these NQR signals are weak. They are detected by their influence on an RF pickup coil, and it is the random thermal (Johnson) noise of the pickup coil and, to a lesser extent, in the first stage of the RF preamplifier that limits the SNR of the detected signal. It is primarily the low SNR that has restricted the practical use of NQR. The conventional SNR derivation of NMR [3] evaluates the size of the NMR signal induced in a solenoidal coil that surrounds the sample. However, for the landmine case, we calculate the NQR signal induced through the mutual inductance between a circular surface pickup coil and a fictitious coil modeling the surface current flowing in the landmine from the NQR magnetization.
For a nuclear spin 1, there are three energy levels. For a simple NQR measurement, the signal arising from the transitions between any pair of those levels can be used. The observed signal arises from the net nuclear magnetization, , produced after a pulsed RF excitation. The magnetization oscillates at the NQR frequency and has a magnitude where is the number of nuclei, is the sample volume, and is the magnitude of the magnetic moment of each nucleus. The last term in parentheses is the Boltzmann factor, of order 10 for . Also, for , 2.04 10 J/T. In a powder, not all crystallites are excited and detected equally, since signal is observed only from the component of the NQR polarization that is aligned along the RF axis. The factor of 0.43 provides the appropriate weighting for the detection of NQR signals from crystallites in an (unoriented) powder.
The external magnetic fields from a material with a magnetization can be treated by considering equivalent (bound) surface currents. For the simple detection geometry shown in Fig. 4 , where the landmine is approximated by a thin disk with radius and thickness , and with the assumption that the nuclear magnetization is uniform within the sample, the fields due to the sample are the same as those produced by a circular current loop of radius with a current ; see [4] . For , this is where is the mass of the sample and is the fraction of the mass ascribed to the transition under observation (typically 2% to 10% for explosives).
A typical NQR detection coil circuit is shown in Fig. 5 . The reactance (using an inductance or capacitance) is chosen so that the resonant combination presents an impedance (often 50 ) to the preamplifier in order to obtain the lowest amplifier noise figure. The magnitude of the observed signal (referenced to the input of the amplifier) is then given by [5] where is the quality factor of the tuned circuit (typically 100 to 500), and is the mutual inductance between the current loop (which models the sample) and the pick-up coil . Fig. 6 shows typical values for that would be encountered for landmine detection . With representative values of  200,  H,  , 1 MHz, an AP landmine with 100 g of explosive in a 1 cm thick by 5 cm radius disk buried 7 cm, and with 0.1, one gets nV (0-peak volts, 14 nV rms or 144 dBm). For comparison, at the resonance frequency , the thermal noise from the NQR detection circuit will be the same as that of a resistor, . The rms thermal noise is given by the well-known expression where the appropriate bandwidth is the bandwidth of the NQR signal (typically 1 kHz). At room temperature, one can expect 28 nV (or 138 dBm). With the typical values above, this implies a (voltage) SNR of 0.5 ( 6 dB). To obtain a higher SNR for adequate detection, the measurement can be repeated times, and averaged. The (voltage) SNR will increase proportionally to and so a usable SNR can be obtained. Note that the NQR signals from this putative AP mine are comparable to thermal noise, at a nominal power density of 168 dBm/(Hz). Other electromagnetic techniques (ground penetrating radar, EM eddy current detectors, etc.) enjoy a return signal of much higher level, although they can suffer severely from the clutter problem.
The calculation above gives the maximum SNR one can expect for a single measurement. A number of practical considerations conspire to reduce this value. In particular, the size of the detector coil cannot be optimal for all mines and mine depths, but must reflect an informed compromise. In addition, for measurements in the field, what is desired is a high SNR per unit time, and hence, the signals to be averaged must be collected as rapidly as possible. In the following, we discuss some of these practical challenges and solutions that are being pursued to develop NQR as a practical landmine detection technique.
IV. ENHANCING THE SNR
We look further into some of the details of the NQR phenomenon that dictate the size of the detected signal. As noted earlier, has three possible NQR transition frequencies, conventionally labeled , , and . So for RDX, there are a total of 18 possible NQR frequencies for the six different nitrogens. In magnetic resonance with a Faraday Law detector coil, the SNR scales roughly as the 3/2 power of the Larmor frequency, and so, all things being equal, the high frequency lines ( ) are expected to exhibit the greatest SNR. However, each line has associated NQR relaxation times, analogous to those in NMR. Despite the complications of the multiple energy levels, under certain conditions ( [6] ) one can view a particular transition as arising from a fictitious spin-1/2, two-level system in a magnetic field and use the phenomenological Bloch equations [7] to describe the evolution of the magnetization with time, under different starting conditions. Associated with such a simple description are the following relaxation times.
"Spin-lattice relaxation time," the time required to return the population difference of the two-level system to thermal (Boltzmann) equilibrium; for the three explosives of interest for landmine detection, values range from 10 ms to 10 s, at room temperature. In addition, there can be a significant temperature dependence to the NQR frequency (ca 60-500 Hz/ C) due to lattice expansion that slightly alters the electronic configuration. So, the SNR obtainable per unit time is actually a complicated function of these NQR relaxation parameters, the Larmor frequency, and the temperature coefficient.
A. RDX Detection-An Example
The simplest RDX detection technique looks at only one of these 18 possible transitions, the 3.41 MHz line that has the weakest temperature dependence, about 60 Hz/ C. A typical detection algorithm involves the following steps:
1) repetitive sampling of the NQR signal in the time domain (see the following for more details); 2) apodization of the time-averaged signal based on a "matched filter" estimate of the time domain decay rates and perhaps 3) Fourier transformation; 4) proper phasing of the complex frequency spectrum; 5) a peak-picking routine to extract the largest peak within the frequency range corresponding to the maximum expected temperature range. For the 3.41 MHz RDX line, the resonance line is about 400 Hz wide and for an expected temperature range of 80 C, the signal could be anywhere in a 5 kHz bandwidth. Hence, one seeks the largest peak above a predetermined threshold in that 5 kHz range. A more sophisticated approach is to observe multiple RDX lines. Since the noise is random at the different resonance frequencies, at least in a well-shielded RF environment, the overall SNR is improved as the square root of the number of lines observed, assuming they have comparable frequencies and relaxation times. But the observation of multiple lines can have some advantage beyond the direct improvement of SNR. The peak picking algorithm can be modified to reflect the frequency correlation in the two lines.
B. Pulse Sequences and -Damping
However, this low signal level is only part of the story. If the NQR signal were a weak cw RF signal, then the usual approach would be to signal average, improving SNR as the root of the averaging time, and also to integrate over the expected bandwidth of the signal. For these pulsed techniques, the NQR signal is available only for a brief time. The simplest, though not necessarily most efficient, approach in NQR is to apply an RF pulse that produces a maximum signal, the so-called 90 pulse and observe the free induction decay or fid, lasting a time . Just as in radar, there is a premium placed on a rapid recovery of the receiver from the high power RF pulse. A 1 kw (60 dBm) RF pulse must decay down over 200 dB (ten orders of magnitude in voltage). And, since the NQR signal decays with a time constant of , the receiver recovery must be rapid on the timescale of . Such a 200 dB decay requires 23 time constants with . For a of 200 at a TNT frequency (842 kHz), one estimates that 75 s, and so a 6 ms recovery time would be required. However, the width of that TNT line is 800 Hz, with a of 0.4 ms, and so the TNT signal would be negligible by the time the receiver recovered. This argument shows that either one must use specialized " -damping" circuitry or other means to rapidly dissipate the coil energy and/or employ "spin-echo" techniques, in which the NQR signal is created as an echo at some time away from the RF pulse.
This simple one-pulse experiment can then be repeated after waiting a time for the spins to repolarize. Hence the averaging time is reduced by this duty cycle limitation, of . For RDX this limitation is not severe: at room temperature the ratio is of the order of 0.8 ms/11 ms 0.07, while for TNT it is 0.4 ms/4 s 10 . Clearly, accumulating one fid every 4 s is highly inefficient for TNT. Again, echo techniques (spin lock spin echo [SLSE]) can be used to create a train of echoes only a ms or so apart, and lasting about 50 ms for TNT. An echo roughly corresponds to two fids arranged back to back in time. Hence, a sequence of echoes spaced 1 ms apart over a time of 50 ms provides an improvement in SNR of the order of (2 50 ms/1 ms) 10 over the one-pulse approach. The actual improvement is significantly less since the echoes decay over this 50 ms period, and the efficiency of echo formation is much less than unity. However, it is these echo sequences that are necessary, so far, to improve the SNR for the weak signals from TNT.
C. Coil Design
In addition to devising pulse sequences that maximize SNR per unit time, it is necessary to optimize the RF coil design to improve detectability and reduce the RF transmitter requirements. It is well-known that SNR scales with , and so reducing coil losses is quite advantageous. The coupling of the coil to electrically lossy media, such as wet soil, must also be considered [8] . Furthermore, coil efficiency is quite important, especially for the surface coils used for landmine detection. A simple reciprocity argument predicts that. at a given distance from the coil, the SNR will scale as the RF field per unit current. Since the field of a surface coil falls off rapidly beyond about one coil radius, the maximum search depth for an NQR detector is largely determined by the coil size, of the order of 10-100 cm for these applications. This coil length scale defines the extent of the remote sensing capability of NQR.
D. Advantages of Random Noise
While the low SNR can be a limitation for detecting small AP mines and hence there are bound to be false alarms if the signal threshold is set just above the random noise value, it is worth emphasizing that a detector limited by random noise, as opposed to the systematic "noise" of clutter, can clear its own false alarms. That is, one can trade off improved SNR (and hence improved detectability) for averaging time: it may be much more efficient, and far safer, to use the NQR detector in a "sweep" mode, and then to resolve any false alarms by placing the detector over the suspected target and signal averaging for some time, rather than attempting to probe mechanically.
E. RF Interference
In the laboratory, it is straightforward to shield the NQR pickup coil against external RF interference, perhaps from far field AM radio transmitters or near-field sources such as the harmonics from switching power supplies. However, for landmine detection in the field, RF interference can be quite significant in an unshielded coil if no other precautions are taken. There are two main strategies to removing this interference: passive and active. At NRL we have shown that an NQR gradiometer coil, such as a figure-eight coil or axial gradiometer, can reduce far field magnetic interference by 30 dB, and that electrical pickup can be reduced as well [9] . Moreover, these gradiometers are less sensitive to electrical loss in the soil since the RF magnetic field drops off rapidly with distance [8] . But in such a gradiometer, the NQR signal is generally weaker than in a simple surface coil. The active approach, pursued at Quantum Magnetics, employs a very efficient NQR coil and an external, remote antenna designed to pickup the RF interference. This detected interference can then be digitally subtracted from the NQR signal, see below. High dynamic range and careful balancing is required for this active approach.
V. USE OF NQR AS A LANDMINE AND EXPLOSIVES DETECTOR
A. Origins
Many researchers throughout the world have contributed to the use of NQR for landmine detection. The history of NQR detection of landmines traces back to the actual origin of NQR.
The precursor to NQR is NMR, discovered independently and simultaneously by Bloch, Hanson, and Packard [10] at Stanford University, Stanford, CA, and Purcell, Torrey, and Pound [11] at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, in 1946. The Harvard researchers were actively involved in the MIT Radiation Laboratory's development of radar during World War II and were highly skilled in the relevant RF technologies, and possessed a deep understanding of the underlying physics. The first NMR signal at Harvard was from the protons in solid paraffin, a simple spin-1/2 system. Pound was also interested in observation of higher-spin nuclei, and predicted the effects of quadrupole couplings in a static magnetic field [12] . The first "pure" NQR, that is in the absence of an external magnetic field, was demonstrated by Dehmelt and Kruger [13] in 1950. Professor Robert Pound recalls [14] "A final part of [George] Watkins' thesis was the report of the pure nuclear quadrupole resonance of nitrogen. We undertook that effort when I returned from England in the fall of 1951. I had been led to suggest the search for such a resonance from a discussion with the British Army who were seeking new ways to detect explosives, particularly in landmines [italics added], and were speculating about NMR as a possibility. The need to project a uniform magnetic field as well as an RF field into the ground seemed a bit problematic. Brebis Bleaney and I journeyed down to the laboratory at Christ Church [England] where we learned that nitrogen is a common component of explosives. Back at Harvard, E. Bright Wilson provided us with several molecular solids containing well bonded nitrogen, one being hexamethylene tetramine, and we soon found its nitrogen quadrupole resonance at a few MHz in zero magnetic field, with our frequency scanning marginal oscillator to which we had added an on-and-off square wave of magnetic field to provide modulation for narrow band lock-in detection. For good measure, we also observed the nitrogen resonance in ICN and BrCN ." Apparently, Professor Pound did not pursue NQR for landmine detection at the time. The idea to use NQR was picked up and pursued independently at a number of laboratories worldwide.
In the early 1960s, Mr. D. King, Southwest Research, Inc., San Antonio, TX, completed a thesis on the use of NQR, and Southwest Research briefly explored NQR for explosives detection during that time. They switched over to NMR detection for luggage inspection in the 1970s [15] - [17] .
In the 1970s, Prof. R. Marino, Hunter College, New York, worked with researchers at Block Engineering with funding for landmine detection from the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps [18] - [21] .
Prof. V. S. Grechishkin, Kaliningrad University, Kaliningrad, Russia, has worked on remote NQR detection since the 1970s and NQR detection for landmines and small package inspection since the 1980s [22] , [30] - [33] . His students and collaborators have continued this work from Kaliningrad at the Institute of Applied Physics, Novosibirsk, Russia, and with the SEE Corporation, Australia. He has also stimulated work at Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland, Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany, and Wuhan University, Wuhan, China. Theoretical efforts, motivated by the explosives detection problem have been conducted at Kazan University, Tartarstan, and the Institute of Chemical Physics, Chernogolovka, Russia.
Hitachi Central Research, Tokyo, Japan, briefly pursued NQR explosives detection in the laboratory [23] , but it is not clear they considered landmines.
Prof. J. A. S. Smith, King's College, University of London, London, U.K., has worked extensively in the area of explosives detection, supported in part by the British Technology Group, Ltd, and the U.K. Defence Evaluation and Research Agency. During the early 1980s, Smith and coworkers explored "double resonance" methods of NQR, a hybrid NMR/NQR approach in which a quasi static magnetic field is rapidly ramped up or down, bringing the nitrogen nuclei into "thermal contact" with the nearby protons by matching the proton Zeeman splitting in the static magnetic field with the nitrogen NQR splittings. The proton resonance is then observed. In the laboratory, these double resonance methods have great merit, but are quite difficult to implement in the field. In the late 1980s Smith turned to pure NQR for explosives and narcotics detection for security applications and, later on, for landmine detection [24] , [34] .
Prof. J. Schiano, Pennsylvania State University, State College, with support of the U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratories, has examined the use of active feedback as a potential means to improve the detection of landmines by NQR [25] .
At the NRL, we have been involved with the use of NMR for explosives detection since 1983 and actively pursued NQR for explosives and narcotics detection since 1987 [26] , [35] - [41] , [44] . Some of the NRL technology has been licensed to Quantum Magnetics, Inc.
Quantum Magnetics, a subsidiary of InVision Technologies, has been active in the use of magnetic resonance for security applications since 1988 and has been developing NQR systems for airport security, narcotics detection, and landmine detection since 1993 [27] , [42] , [43] .
In addition to the limited literature cited, there are now about 40 patents and applications on NQR as a detection technology.
This capsule history gives only a flavor for the history of NQR for explosives detection and is by no means comprehensive. In the laboratory, many researchers have easily obtained the NQR signal from an explosive, but many technical problems had to be solved before these systems could become practical in the field, even at the prototype level.
We now present some of the most recent results from a laboratory prototype landmine detector, operated in field conditions.
VI. DEVELOPMENT AND FIELD TESTING OF AN NQR LANDMINE DETECTION PROTOTYPE
Quantum Magnetics has recently developed a prototype field system capable of detecting RDX, TNT, and metal-encased mines. This system was extensively tested in the Fall of 1999 at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) mine lanes, Fort Leonard Wood, MO. The tests included metal-free RDX and TNT mines as well as some metal-containing mines. Representatives of DARPA supervised these (single-) blind tests to ensure validity of the results.
A. System Description
The NQR mine detection prototype used in these tests consists of a handheld sensor head connected to a set of rack mounted electronics by means of a cable bundle. A partial schematic of the major system component is shown in Fig. 7 . The power supplies, high power transmit RF amplifier, computer and data acquisition module are contained in the 19-in rack system. High power RF pulses, control signals, and the amplified NQR signal are carried in the cable connected to the handheld sensor head. The handheld sensor head consists of the PEP (preamplification, receiver protection and muliplexing electronics), relays and capacitors (tuning between RDX and TNT as well as fine tuning and matching), and the RF detection coil itself. Some details of the electronics are not shown such as the active -damping system and the physical structure of the handheld sensor itself. The radio frequency interference (RFI) detection electronics are contained in a separate module consisting of RF antennae, low noise receiver electronics, and multiplexing circuitry. In the field there are many sources of manmade electrical interference, including AM radio transmissions around the TNT frequencies. The computer uses the signal from the RFI detection to remove radio frequency interference detected by the main NQR detection coil.
Operation of the system is relatively automatic. The operator positions the sensor over the area to be investigated and then presses a button on the handheld sensor. The computer initiates an automated tuning protocol for RDX (TNT can also be done first if desired). Results from the tuning protocol are used to determine the presence of a metal in the ground and to correctly tune the coil for optimal detection sensitivity. The one-second RDX scan and signal processing are executed and an alarm is indicated if the signal intensity is sufficient. The same is then carried out for TNT. At this stage in the development process, all of the raw data are collected and the signal processing results are saved for future analysis.
The actual scanning time spent pulsing and acquiring data per site is 1.5 s, but delays associated with the need to log all data acquired in the field and the developmental nature of the processing and control software add an overhead of 12 s. Removal of these extra delays is a very straightforward streamlining task and will be pursued in the next generation prototype.
TNT has a relatively long , and is quite short, so an SLSE sequence is used for detection. RDX on the other hand has a very short and is , so a steady state free precession sequence such as phase alternated pulse sequence/nonphase alternated pulse sequence (PAPS/NPAPS) is employed [28] .
B. Field Test Results October 1999
The October 1999 tests at Fort Leonard Wood concentrated on the detection of antitank mines. To demonstrate the potential for rapid scanning, it was important to keep the scan time to 2 s. Since TNT has such long relaxation times, it was only possible to do a single SLSE scan. Furthermore, there is little benefit in increasing the SLSE scan time much beyond the effective time of TNT; at 25 C, the effective time for TNT under the SLSE sequence is 150 ms. The total scan time for TNT was therefore set to 250 ms. RDX has short relaxation times, so it is possible to collect signals continuously. In order to achieve the best possible RDX detection performance, the RDX scan time was set to 2 s. The RDX sensitivity is therefore much better than TNT sensitivity. The RDX detection threshold can therefore be set so high that RDX detection will not contribute to the overall false alarm rate of the combined RDX/TNT scan. The mine lane was 26-m in length by 1.12-m wide and was covered with a plastic tarp to hide any soil disturbance from the research team. There were twenty TMA-4, two Type 72, and one TMM-1 AT landmines buried with a 2 cm to 5 cm overburden. The mine characteristics are summarized in Table I .
The mine lane was overlaid with rectangular grids containing 15 cm cells. The grid ensures that the mine lane is scanned completely and in a regular manner; the grid also helps with the development of QR signal maps in post processing. Each cell was measured one time and the entire grid was scanned using a pattern that reduces TNT saturation effects between neighboring cells.
Maps of the QR and metal detection signals are shown in Figs. 8 and 9 . The data for the western half of the lane are in Fig. 8 (measured on October 29), and the data for the eastern half of the lane are shown in Fig. 9 (measured on October 30). For both figures, the ground truth, actual location, and type of mines, is shown above with the depth of the mine listed at the top. Due to the roughness of the ground, the distance from the QR sensor head to the top of the mine was 2 to 3 cm greater than the actual overburden. The color of the circles indicate the mine type: green TMA-4, blue empty void, maroon Type 72, red TMM-1. The QR and metal detection signal maps use a color scale with signal intensity increasing from blue to red. Overall the detection performance is quite good, even though the system sensitivity to TNT decreased on the second day for unknown reasons. For the threshold level used during the test, the data from October 29 shows no false alarms (the small signal for metal detection is well below the threshold level but representative of a small amount of metal) and 100% probability of detection (PD). Within the October 30 data there are five false alarms for TNT and 100% detection of all targets. The voids of course do not count as mine targets.
The detection performance may be looked at in a number of ways and depends upon details such as the detection halo around the mine, but one can arrive at a few quantifiers of the system performance. The total number of cells scanned on the two days is 2588. Approximately 10-20% of these cells occupied a space where a positive detection was made. Of approximately 2070 empty cells, the system recorded five false alarms. The average probability of false alarms PFA 0.25% over the two days. The equivalent area false alarm rate or false alarm rate per square meter is given by FAR 0.11/m . All mines were detected on both days leading to an average probability of detection PD 100%.
The sensitivity profile of the detection coil used in these tests is such that it has moderate sensitivity for a mine up to about 15 cm from its center. A mine with a very large mass, such as a shallow AT mine, will produce a clearly detectable signal at such range. The NQR and metal detection signal are plotted as a function of distance to the nearest mine in Fig. 10 . The localizing capability of the coil is clearly evident. Given that the mines are approximately 30 cm across, it is evident that the small NQR detection coil used at Fort Leonard Wood can localize them to within a few centimeters of their outer edges [29] . 
C. Field Test Results November-December 1999
Quantum Magnetics returned to Fort Leonard Wood on November 29, 1999 for additional field tests. The results presented here concentrate on the detection of antipersonnel (AP) mines at a blind test lane set up at the Fort Leonard Wood site. The lane was 4.48 m 1.12 m and contained seven PMA-1A mines and five VS50 mines. The mine characteristics are summarized in Table II. A total of three separate passes of the lane were carried out on the same day. A 0.6 s TNT scan and 1.5 s RDX scan was used for each cell. The results for the TNT mines are plotted in Fig. 11(a) using the threshold set up prior to the test. This threshold was set well before the test and was not optimized for the test site or for weather conditions. Each pass of the mine lane required 256 discrete measurements. Each mine was detected in all three passes of the lane (i.e., PD 100%). For the initial threshold, the numbers of false alarms for each pass were 22, seven, and 14.
By comparing successive passes, it is possible to determine the effect of rescanning all the initial alarms. The results are shown in Fig. 11(b) . If the alarms in Pass 1 are confirmed by the correspondingcellmeasurementinPass2,thenallof thetruedetections remain but all of the false alarms are removed. The same complete clearance is achieved by comparing Pass 3 with the initial alarms of Pass 2. Combining Pass 3 and Pass 1 produces two remaining false alarms corresponding to 0.4 per m .
False color plots of the combined signal for all three passes are shown in Fig. 12 . The location of all seven TNT AP mines is clearly visible. Markers placed on the plastic sheet during the test were later all found to lie within the area of the individual mine cases. The system was also able to detect all five VS50 RDX mines. It should be noted that the VS50s also gave a clear metal signal that is thought to be due to a metal locator plate within them.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The magnetic resonance technique of NQR shows great promise and very encouraging early results for the detection of landmines. The specificity of NQR to the explosives of interest (TNT, RDX, and tetryl), and the absence of clutter signals distinguish NQR from all the other methods of finding bulk explosives. These other approaches suffer from the problem of clutter signals from nonlandmine targets. To date, the major limitation of NQR is the weak SNR, and substantial improvement in SNR has been achieved over the past decade by the careful design of NQR pulse sequences, optimization of detector geometries, and attention to detail in the engineering design. Substantial progress in this area has been made by researchers worldwide, and it is hoped that NQR will provide one of the necessary tools to reduce the threat of landmines.
